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FLORIDA’S HEALTHCARE CRISIS: USING BREACH OF OPEN-PRICE 
CONTRACTS AND THE FLORIDA CONSUMER COLLECTION PRACTICES 











Imagine for a moment that you are an expectant mother who is going into labor.1 
After going through all of the pain associated with child birth, your doctor informs you of 
the horrifying fact that one of the three children you just gave birth to passed away having 
only experienced life for three brief minutes.2  With the other two children still in the 
intensive care unit, you return home only to discover a medical bill addressed to the parent 
of your child that passed away.3 At first, you are confused, and then, you become angry.4 
As it turns out, your child that passed away could not be added to your insurance due to 
the child’s brief life span, and despite the fact that the child received no medical care, the 
hospital contends that your child’s three-minute existence within the facility’s walls came 
at a cost of $600 that you are personally responsible for.5 The story described is what 
happened to Jennifer Gunter (“Jennifer”), and when these events transpired, Jennifer was 
employed as a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology (“OBGYN”) at the hospital that sent 
her the bill.   
Jennifer’s story would probably lead most people to conclude that it is simply not 
fair to charge a person $600 for merely existing in a hospital for three minutes, but the story 
also sheds light on the illogical manner in which the cost of health care is calculated in the 
United States. The truth is the costs associated with the healthcare system in America have 
been crushing our country’s economy for quite some time.6 In 2013, for example, the 
amount of money spent on healthcare nationally in the United States was equivalent to each 
member of the population paying $9,255.7 The effect of these costs on average Americans 
 
 
1 Sarah Bregel, Woman’s Tweet About Hospital Bill Pinpoints A Lack Of Compassion In US Healthcare, 
SCARY MOMMY (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.scarymommy.com/tweet-deceased-baby-healthcare-
hospital-bill/.  
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Steven I. Weissman, Remedies for an Epidemic of Medical Provider Price Gouging, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2016, 
at 22, 23.   
7 Id. 
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is evident from the fact that a majority of the bankruptcies in the United States are filed 
due to medical expenses.8 In short, healthcare costs are bankrupting Americans with 
citizens in the United States spending 2.3 times more money on healthcare than on food 
and beverages in 2012.9 Moreover, it has become clear that merely obtaining health 
insurance will not alleviate the overarching problem, since despite a 5.8% increase in 
private health insurance spending in 2018, out-of-pocket medical expenditures still rose 
2.8% thereby accounting for 10% of all health care expenditures nationally in 2018.10  
Though every state has been affected in some way by the national healthcare crisis, 
Florida, with respect to hospital-related costs specifically, has been faced with a unique 
challenge because, as of 2016, it was home to twenty of America’s highest priced 
hospitals.11 These hospitals have been reported to charge patients anywhere from 9.2 to 
12.6 times more than the Medicare-allowable rates for medical services,12 and this has 
resulted in patients being charged 920% to 1,260% more for healthcare services than what 
it actually costs to render the service.13 Though large profit margins are not uncommon in 
certain sectors of the healthcare industry,14 abnormal spikes in the cost of healthcare-related 
expenses will normally attract the attention of legislators.15 Unfortunately, the pricing 
strategies of Florida’s hospitals have either not been addressed or have been inadequately 
addressed by the Florida legislature, since as of September of 2019, Florida was ranked by 
John Hopkins University as being the seventh most expensive state for hospital care with 
patients being charged 5.8 times more than the Medicare-allowable rate for healthcare.16   
Consequently, the next question that should be asked is, are patients legally 
obligated to pay these, some might call predatory, hospital bills? The short answer, based 
on Florida’s caselaw, is that at least in cases where an individual has signed an admission 
contract obligating them to pay “all charges . . . in accordance with existing standard and 
current rates as set forth in regular schedules[,]” an individual is only required to pay the 
reasonable price for the healthcare received and is entitled to “question the reasonableness” 
 
 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., NHE Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet 
(last modified Mar. 24, 2020).  
11 Weissman, supra note 6, at 24.  
12 Id.  
13  Patterson Clark & Katie Park, The Top 50 Hospitals that Gouge Patients the Most, WASHINGTON POST 
(June 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/health/hospital-price-gouging/.  
14 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DRUG INDUSTRY PROFITS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 1 (2017).  
15 Jacqueline Howard, On Rising Insulin Prices, Lawmaker Tells Pharma Execs: 'Your Days Are 
Numbered', CNN (last updated Apr. 10, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/10/health/insulin-
prices-congressional-hearing-bn/index.html.   
16 Peiqi Wang et al., Hospital Prices in the United States: An Analysis of U.S. Cities and States, JOHNS 
HOPKINS U., (2019) https://npr-
brightspot.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy/sites/wusf/files/201910/hospital_prices_in_the_u.s._report.pdf.  
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of the price charged by the provider.17 As one might imagine, whether or not a hospital has 
charged a patient a “reasonable” fee for services rendered is debatable and depends on a 
number of factors.18  
Thus, although the healthcare crisis in the United States is a national problem and 
price gouging in the healthcare industry is but only one subset of that problem,19 this article 
discusses how state courts from various jurisdictions evaluate the reasonableness of the 
fees charged by healthcare providers and proposes a potential solution to the price gouging 
problem in Florida and other states that have enacted legislation that is similar to the Florida 
Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”).  
Part II of this note discusses the legal problem that inflated and unreasonable 
hospital bills pose for consumers as well as the potential solutions that have been proposed 
previously. Part III evaluates the various factors from other jurisdictions that have been 
adopted by Florida courts to determine whether the fees charged by medical providers 
pursuant to an open-price contract are reasonable. Part IV argues that although a litigant 
has more than one possible cause of action against a hospital charging unreasonable fees 
for care rendered on a walk-in or emergency basis,20 the charging of unreasonable fees 
represents a violation of the FCCPA and that bringing a cause of action under the FCCPA 
in conjunction with other contract-based causes of action will give consumers effected by 




I.  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
 
The secrecy surrounding how and what hospitals actually charge for their services 
is both an intentionally created aspect of a hospital’s billing practices and the cause of the 
underlying threat that inflated hospital bills pose to the general public.21 As an article 
published by the Florida Bar Journal and authored by Steven Weissman titled Remedies 
for an Epidemic of Medical Provider Price Gouging makes clear, “‘[i]nsurers and hospitals 
include gag provisions, requiring the parties to maintain hospital pricing as a trade secret’ 
thereby ensuring that the prices charged to different entities are ‘cloaked in secrecy.’”22 
Each hospital maintains what is referred to as a “charge master” or “list price” for each of 
the services a hospital renders, but such “prices are billed only for the small minority of 
services performed when no insurance is involved[,]” with private insurance companies on 
 
 
17 Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Carr, 297 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); see also Payne v. Humana 
Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  
18 Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
19 See generally Weissman, supra note 6.  
20 David Stahl, Article I. The Role of The Florida Courts in Protecting the Uninsured from Being 
Overcharged for Emergency Medical Services, 33 NOVA L. REV. 269, 271 (2008); see also Weissman, 
supra note 6, at 27.  
21 Weissman, supra note 6, at 23-24.  
22 Id. at 23. 
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average paying 1.6 times the Medicare-allowable rate and the charge master prices being 
9.2 to 12.6 times the Medicare-allowable rate.23  
 
A. The Legal Conundrum Associated with Evaluating Claims 
 
This wild variation poses a practical problem for legal practitioners who are tasked 
with evaluating the merits of a client’s initial claim that they are being charged an 
unreasonable price, because as discussed infra, the factors used by Florida courts to 
evaluate the reasonableness of a hospital’s fees—a market analysis of what the defendant 
and other similarly situated hospitals charge, the usual and customary rates the defendant 
hospital charges and receives, and the defendant hospital’s internal cost structure—all 
center around the price that the defendant hospital and other similar hospitals actually 
charge individuals, government entities, and private insurers alike.24 Thus, an attorney that 
is evaluating the reasonableness of a particular hospital bill would be left to essentially 
guess as to: (1) whether the hospital bill is indeed unreasonable, (2) if the bill is 
unreasonable, the extent to which it is unreasonable, and (3) whether such 
unreasonableness is to such a degree that engaging in litigation is financially sound for the 
client.  
However, in 2017, Florida’s Agency for Healthcare Administration, the state 
agency responsible for regulating and licensing medical providers that participate in the 
Medicaid program, launched a free online tool, the Florida Health Price Finder, that allows 
users to view the national, state, and, in some cases, county average price for a particular 
medical procedure.25 While this tool may be helpful for attorneys evaluating the 
reasonableness of a particular hospital bill, it does not resolve the issue of a client being 
unable to finance the litigation needed to dispute a hospital’s fees.  
 
B. The Economic Status of Those Effected by Absorbent Hospital Bills 
 
According to the United States Census Bureau, those that lack health insurance in 
the United States are disproportionately more likely to live in poverty, are considered low-
income individuals, and have less than a high school level of education.26 Similarly, a 
report published by the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) indicated that 71% of low-
income households experienced at least one legal problem in the civil context in 2016, 86% 
of the legal problems reported by low-income Americans received inadequate or no legal 
help, and low-income Americans would likely approach LCS with 1.7 million legal 
 
 
23 Id. at 23-24. 
24 Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270-73 (S.D. Fla. 2006).  
25 Christine Sexton, Health Price Website Gets Little Public Attention, WUSF PUBLIC MEDIA (Oct. 9, 2020, 
11:08 AM), https://wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/health-news-florida/2020-10-09/health-price-website-gets-little-
public-attention.  
26 Edward Berchick, Who Are the Uninsured, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/09/who-are-the-uninsured.html.  
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problems in 2017.27 The report went on to indicate that of the problems posed to the LCS 
by low-income Americans, more than half of these problems would be addressed with little 
or no legal assistance due to a lack of resources.28  
In other words, the same individuals who are likely to have no health insurance, 
and thus be charged for healthcare pursuant to the prices in a hospital’s chargemaster, are 
also the same individuals who are likely to receive little or no legal help with their civil 
legal problems. Consequently, any solution that is likely to address the price gouging 
problem among Florida’s hospitals needs to include a means of both allowing those 
affected by these pricing tactics to have access to legal representation with little or no 
upfront costs and a method for allowing attorneys who undertake representation of these 
individuals to collect a fee for their services.  
 
C. Previously Proposed Solutions 
 
Other authors have proposed a few different possible causes of action that could be 
utilized as a mechanism to combat predatory hospital pricing, including: fraud in the 
inducement, breach of an open-price contract, and violation of the Florida Deceptive and 
Unfair Trade Practices Act. 
 
Fraud in the Inducement 
 
 Under Florida law, a plaintiff must prove four elements to prevail in a cause of 
action for fraud in the inducement: “(1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) that [the] 
maker of the misrepresentation knew or should have known of the statement's falsities; (3) 
intent by the maker of the statement that the representation induce another to rely and act 
on it; and (4) resulting injury to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the 
representation.”29  
Steven Weissman (“Weissman”), author of the Florida Bar Journal article 
referenced previously, has argued that a typical hospital billing dispute might fit within 
these elements due to the nature of a hospital’s billing procedures.30 Specifically, by 
entering into a contract with a patient to pay “standard rates” for services rendered and 
billing a patient at the rate from the charge master, a hospital misrepresents a material fact 
by leading a patient to believe that the rates listed in the charge master are the “standard” 
rates, when in reality, the charge master rates are not “standard rates” at all given that only 
a fraction of the bills paid to a hospital are paid at the charge master price.31 Weissman 
does not specifically address how such a case would fit into the second element,32 but one 
 
 
27 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME 
AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.    
28 Id.  
29 Palumbo v. Moore, 777 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).    
30 Weissman, supra note 6, at 27-28.  
31 Weissman, supra note 6, at 27.  
32 Weissman, supra note 6, at 28. 
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could imagine how the knowledge element could be satisfied based on the hospital billing 
tactics described supra.  
A hospital would satisfy the third element when admitting a patient, because when 
a hospital offers a patient an admission contract representing that the patient will only be 
charged the “standard rates,” i.e. the inducement, knowing that the standard rates are not 
standard at all, i.e. the representation, the patient, under the belief that he or she is being 
charged the standard rate, agrees to the admission or treatment, or acts on the inducement.33 
The fourth element would be satisfied after the patient is billed for the services at the charge 
master rates, because those rates are substantially higher than the actual “standard rates”—
meaning those rates paid by the majority of customers, which are usually private and 
governmental health insurance entities.34  
 
Breach of an Open-Price Contract 
 
David Stahl (“Stahl”), author of the article titled Article I. The Role of The Florida 
Courts in Protecting the Uninsured from Being Overcharged for Emergency Medical 
Services, has proposed breach of an open-price contract as a possible legal option for 
patients that have fallen victim to hospital price gouging.35 A plaintiff is required to prove 
two things in order to prevail in a cause of action for breach of an open-price contract in 
Florida: (1) that an open-price contract formed between the parties in which case a 
reasonable price is implied by law and (2) that the defendant breached the contract by 
charging an unreasonable price for the services rendered.36 
Although proving that an open-price contract formed may be fairly straight forward 
in most cases, Florida courts have held that the determination of what constitutes a 
“reasonable” fee is a question of fact that should be answered by the fact finder.37 
Consequently, much of the litigation surrounding these claims and the opinions that have 
been rendered in connection with that litigation, have focused on the plaintiff’s ability to 
survive the pre-trial stage of the judicial process.38 To survive a Motion for Summary 
Judgement, a plaintiff must be able to convince a judge that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable jury could 





35 Stahl, supra note 20, at 271.  
36 Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2006); see also Giacalone v. Helen 
Ellis Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 8 So. 3d 1232, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that evidence of 
unreasonableness was critical to claim breach of contract for a breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing).  
37 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sestile, 821 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).  
38 Herrera v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2015), rev'd, 648 F. App'x 
930 (11th Cir. 2016).   
39 See Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (“Summary 
judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”).   
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reasonableness of a hospital’s charges, Florida courts have looked at three nonexclusive 
factors: “(1) an analysis of the relevant market for hospital services (including the rates 
charged by other similarly situated hospitals for similar services); (2) the usual and 
customary rate [the hospital] charges and receives for its hospital services; and (3) [the 
hospital’s] internal cost structure.”40  
As stated supra, the fact that two of these factors—the usual and customary rates 
the hospital charges and receives for its services and the hospital’s internal cost structure—
are dependent on information that will, in most cases, have to be provided by a defendant 
hospital during the discovery process41 could have a chilling effect on a litigant’s ability to 
bring a cause of action for breach of an open-price contract due to the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding whether the fee assessed by the hospital was arguably unreasonable.               
However, the problem with both of these arguments is that the majority of people 
who would have standing to bring these claims, mainly individuals without health 
insurance, often lack the necessary financial means to bring such a cause of action.42 Thus, 
most litigants’ only hope for carrying the litigation to fruition would be either to find an 
attorney who would accept their case pro bono or to find an attorney who would accept the 
case on a contingency-fee basis. As indicated supra, a low-income plaintiff seeking pro 
bono legal representation is unlikely to find an attorney to provide such representation,43 
nor is a low-income plaintiff likely to find a contract attorney who would accept the case 
on a contingency-fee basis.44 As a result, the average plaintiff who could bring a cause of 
action against a hospital on a theory of breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, or both, 
would likely be unable to obtain legal representation due to a lack of financial resources. 
 
Violation of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act  
 
In recognizing that importance of potential litigants being able to have access to 
legal representation on a contingency-fee basis, Stahl, the author referenced supra who 
proposed breach of contract as a potential cause of action in hospital price gouging cases, 
theorized that victims of exorbitant hospital bills might also have a potential claim under 
the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act (“FUDTPA”).45 One of the stated 
purposes of the FUDTPA is to “protect the consuming public and legitimate business 
enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, 
 
 
40 Giacalone, 8 So. 3d at 1235 (quoting Colomar v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. 
Fla. 2006)).  
41 Id. at 1234-35.  
42 See supra section I.B. 
43 Id.  
44 Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort Reform: A Reassessment and Reality Check, 64 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 176–77 (2001) (“Plaintiffs retain counsel on a contingent fee basis to pursue a wide 
variety of claims outside the arena of tort law, such as actions based on the violation of federal civil rights, 
antitrust, and securities statutes, and even garden variety collection cases. But the overwhelming number of 
contingent-fee retentions occur in tort cases . . . .”).  
45 Stahl, supra note 20, at 280.   
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deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”46 The 
FUDTPA specifically outlaws, inter alia, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce.”47 However, the FUDTPA contains no definition of 
what type of conduct qualifies as “unfair acts.”48 Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court 
brought clarity to the term in PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Property Management, Inc. by defining 
an unfair practice as one that “offends established public policy and one that is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”49 Moreover, 
the Court clarified that although the exact language of the FUDTPA outlaws “unfair acts,” 
a cause of action can arise from a single unfair or deceptive act.50 
With these principles in mind, Stahl argues that a patient with a cause of action for 
breach of an open-price contract may also have a claim against the offending hospital for 
violating the FUDTPA.51 Stahl points out that bringing a claim for violation of the 
FUDTPA in conjunction with a claim for breach of an open-price contract would be 
beneficial, especially for uninsured patients, because “the statute permits the court to award 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.”52 In essence, Stahl alludes to the same point that is 
made in this article, which is that uninsured patients will normally not be capable of 
financing their own litigation and thus, it is necessary to tie the patient’s underlying claim 
to a statutory cause of action that permits the patient’s attorney to take the case on a 
contingency-fee basis.53 Moreover, Stahl argues in support of his position that the ability 
of a patient’s lawyer to collect attorney’s fees from a hospital charging unreasonable rates 
is important because “without the recovery of attorney's fees, many claims against 
emergency service providers would be ‘negative-value suits’ where the cost of attorney's 
fees exceeds the total expected recovery from the claim.”54 
However, the underlying problem with bringing a claim under the FUDTPA in 
conjunction with a cause of action for fraud in the inducement or breach of an open-price 
contract is that the FUDTPA provides that “the prevailing party . . . may receive his or her 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs from the nonprevailing party.”55 So, given that the 
FUDTPA’s attorney’s fee provision only allows the prevailing party to collect attorney’s 
fees and costs, bringing a claim under the FUDTPA is not without risk to the patient, and 





46 Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2) (2020).  
47 Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1) (2020).  
48 Fla. Stat. § 501.203 (2020).  
49 PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
50 Id.  
51 Stahl, supra note 20, at 280.   
52 Id. at 281.  
53 Id. at 281-82.  
54 Id. at 282.   
55 Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1) (2020) (emphasis added).  
56 Stahl, supra note 20, at 282-83.    
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II. DETERMINING WHETHER A HOSPITAL’S FEES ARE UNREASONABLE 
 
A survey of the case law on the topic of hospital price gouging in the context of 
breach of an open-price contract, and other statutory claims arising from it such as 
violations of the FUDTPA, shows that one of the main factors at issue in these cases is 
whether the rates being charged by hospitals are “reasonable.”57 In Colomar v. Mercy 
Hospital, Inc., Barbra Colomar (“Colomar”) went to the hospital because she was 
experiencing shortness of breath.58 Colomar did not have private health insurance and did 
not qualify for any type of public assistance programs.59 Prior to being admitted, she signed 
an “Authorization and Guarantee” form under which she agreed to pay any hospital bills 
that were not covered by insurance or other means, but the contract did not specify the 
services that Colomar would receive nor did it indicate the amount she would be obligated 
to pay for them.60 The treatment rendered to Colomar by the hospital consisted of steroids, 
oxygen, and respiratory therapy, and Colomar’s stay at the hospital lasted a total of twenty-
six hours.61  
Colomar later received a bill from the hospital for $12,863 and eventually filed a 
class action lawsuit against the hospital on behalf of all uninsured patients at Mercy 
Hospital, alleging breach of contract and two counts of violating the FUDTPA.62 In her 
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Colomar alleged that “the bill she received from 
Mercy was inflated and unfair when compared to the rates charged to, and accepted from, 
patients with insurance or patients covered by Medicaid or Medicare.”63 Colomar claimed 
that “differential pricing alone was sufficient to constitute a breach of contract because 
Florida law requires the amount of an open pricing contract to be reasonable.”64 Though 
the court agreed that Colomar was only obligated to pay a reasonable price for the services 
rendered by the hospital, it concluded that proof of differential pricing, by itself, was not 
sufficient to show that the prices charged by the hospital were unreasonable.65 Accordingly, 
the court dismissed Colomar’s FAC without prejudice but granted her leave to amend and 
allege additional facts that would establish unreasonableness.66  
In her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Colomar made a number of 
allegations that, inter alia, focused on the difference between the amount Colomar was 
charged for the services she received and the amount it actually cost the hospital to render 
the services to her and the difference, in terms of cost, between what uninsured patients 
 
 
57 Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Urquhart v. Manatee Mem'l 
Hosp., No. 8:06-CV-1418-T-17EAJ, 2007 WL 781738, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2007); Day v. Sarasota 
Drs. Hosp., Inc., No. 8:19-CV-1522-VMC-TGW, 2021 WL 288969, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2021). 
58 Colomar, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1267. 
59 Id.   
60 Id. at 1268.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 1267-68.  
63 Id. at 1268. 
64 Id.   
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
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were charged for the hospital’s services and what public and private insurers were paying 
for the hospital’s services.67 In response to Colomar’s SAC, the defendant filed a Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.68  
 
A. Market Analysis  
 
As a starting point, the court determined that “no single factor can be used to 
determine the reasonableness of . . . [a] hospital[’s] charges.”69 Rather, the court concluded, 
based on a thorough review of the case law in Florida and other states, that “several non-
exclusive factors are relevant to the inquiry.”70 The court went on to indicate that “those 
factors include . . . : (1) an analysis of the relevant market for hospital services (including 
the rates charged by other similarly situated hospitals for similar services); (2) the usual 
and customary rate [the hospital] charges and receives for its . . . services; and (3) . . . [the 
hospital’s] internal cost structure.”71 
In response to the defendant’s argument that unreasonable prices could only be 
demonstrated by showing that a hospital’s prices were grossly excessive as compared to 
the market rate for such services, the court determined that such a standard would be “far 
too restrictive a test of reasonableness.”72 However, the court specifically acknowledged 
that without question “what the market charges for similar services is one relevant measure 
of reasonableness.” To support this conclusion, the court cited cases from not only Florida 
but also Tennessee, Indiana, and Illinois — all of which held in some fashion that, in the 
context of an open-price contract, a comparison of an allegedly unreasonable charge by a 
hospital or company for a particular service to the cost of obtaining the same service on the 
open market was relevant, and in some cases required, to determine the reasonableness of 
the charge at issue.73  
In her SAC, Colomar alleged that the prices the defendant was charging for its 
services were in the top 13% of what all hospitals charged and that the defendant’s “cost-
to-charge ratio (a measurement of how much its charges exceed costs) is among the top 
10% of all hospitals.”74 The court concluded that, at the pleading stage, these allegations 
were sufficient to show that the defendant’s pricing structure was at the “extreme end of 
the range . . . ” of what other hospitals were charging for similar services.75 Thus, it is 
possible for the market analysis factor to weigh in favor of unreasonableness if the price 
charged for a service is at the upper or extreme end of what other hospitals are charging 
 
 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 1268-69.  
69 Id. at 1269.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1270.  
73 Id.; See also Bennett v. Behring, 466 F.Supp. 689, 697–98 (S.D.Fla.1979); Victory Mem. Hosp. v. Rice, 
493 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Galloway v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1995); Doe v. HCA Health Serv. of Tenn., 46 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tenn. 2001).  
74 Colomar, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.  
75 Id. 
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for the same service.76 Moreover, this view has found support in the subsequent cases that 
have adopted the test articulated in Colomar.77 
 
B. Differential Pricing  
 
The second factor that the court looked at in Colomar was the defendant’s 
differential pricing scheme, which the court defined as “the price charged for the same 
services to other patients within the same hospital.”78 The court pointed out the reasoning 
as to why this factor was significant in the analysis by indicating that “the prices charged 
to other patients, and the amounts received from them, within the same system often differ, 
and this difference may offer some insight into the value of the actual services provided.”79 
The court ascertained this factor by looking at two cases, one from Florida, Payne v. 
Humana Hospital, and one from Pennsylvania, Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. 
Healthcare Management Alternatives, Inc., which is particularly relevant.80  
In Temple University Hospital, Inc. (“Temple”), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
articulated the appropriate method of calculating damages in a cause of action premised on 
a quasi-contract theory.81 The court indicated that in such cases involving healthcare 
providers “the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable fee for a health provider's 
services.”82 The court indicated that when considering what constitutes a “reasonable fee,” 
the amount that a hospital actually receives for its services is more important to the inquiry 
than its published rates, since the hospital will normally only receive full compensation 
based on its published rates in a small minority of the bills it processes.83 This conclusion 
was based on the fact that there was evidence in Temple that the defendant hospital received 
less than its published rates 94% of the time, and thus, the court held that “those rates 
cannot be considered the value of the benefit conferred because that is not what people in 
the community ordinarily pay for medical services.”84 
 
 
76 Id.  
77 See Day v. Sarasota Doctors Hosp., Inc., No. 8:19-CV-1522-VMC-TGW, 2021 WL 288969, at *7 (M.D. 
Fla. Jan. 28, 2021) (holding that a reasonable jury could infer that a charge was unreasonable based on 
evidence that hospital was charging two to three times what other hospitals were charging for same 
service); Leslie v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. CV171590ESMAH, 2019 WL 4668140, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 
25, 2019) (“In sum, Plaintiffs allege that Quest’s chargemaster prices are unreasonable, unfair, or excessive 
based on . . . payments received for these services by both Quest and other laboratory testing services. . . . 
As to these remaining claims based on a theory of excessive pricing, the [defendant’s] motion to dismiss is 
DENIED.”) 
78 Colomar, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.  
79 Id. at 1272.  
80 Id. (Citing Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); 
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)).  
81 Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 507-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003).  
82 Id. at 508 (emphasis added).  
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
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Accordingly, the court in Colomar adopted the reasoning in Temple and found that 
“the rates hospitals charge for services do not always accurately reflect the value of the 
services, especially when the hospital routinely accepts much less for them.”85 Moreover, 
the court pointed out that if a court were to simply focus on what the defendant hospital 
charged as compared to its competitors, a group of hospitals could grossly overcharge for 
their services, thereby creating false perception of value.86 Since the plaintiff in Colomar 
had alleged that private and government insurance carriers paid significantly less than what 
she was being charged for the defendant hospital’s services, the court determined that 
“[t]his allegation, if borne out during discovery, would be evidence in support of the 
conclusion that the charges imposed on Plaintiff are unreasonable.”87  
 
C. Internal Cost Structure  
 
Lastly, the third factor that the court focused on was the defendant hospital’s 
internal cost structure.88 The court found support for this factor in cases from Illinois, 
Tennessee, and New York — all of which used a hospital’s internal cost structure as a 
factor in determining the reasonableness of charges for services rendered. Even more 
importantly, the court pointed out that analyzing a hospital’s internal cost structure is a 
practical gauge of reasonableness.89 As the court put it, “[i]t makes sense to consider a 
hospital's internal costs in determining whether the hospital's charges are reasonable 
because such evidence might account for different prices that would not be fairly reflected 
in a simple comparison to other hospitals in the market.”90 In defining the contours of the 
cost-structure factor, the court noted that “if a hospital has additional, atypical internal costs 
compared to others in the market, then higher prices might still be reasonable even though 
those rates exceed the market price.”91 After considering the plaintiff’s allegation that the 
defendant hospital had charged her six times what it actually cost the hospital to render the 
service, the court ultimately concluded that it could not “conclude as a matter of law that 
charging 600% above costs is reasonable.”92  
It is worth noting that the decision, analysis, and factors articulated in Colomar 
have been adopted, in part or completely, or cited with approval in various jurisdictions, at 
both the state and federal level, including Alaska, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and South 
Carolina.93 Thus, at the very least, it can be said that various courts are acknowledging that 
 
 
85 Colomar, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 3:12-CV-0065-HRH, 2015 WL 









in the context of hospital pricing, determining what constitutes a “reasonable price” for 
services rendered requires a more in-depth, case-by-case analysis than the average open-
price or quasi-contract claim due to the uniqueness of hospitals’ pricing schemes in general. 
 
 
III. LINKING UNREASONABLE PRICING TO THE FCCPA  
 
The link between a hospital charging unreasonable fees to uninsured or 
underinsured patients and a cause of action under the Florida Consumer Collection 
Practices Act (“FCCPA”) is relatively straight forward in terms of legal theory. The 
FCCPA governs the debt collection activities of both third-party debt collection agencies 
and “any person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”94 The FCCPA was enacted to 
complement the federal version of the legislation, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), and the Florida legislature clearly intended for the FCCPA to provide Florida 
residents with more protection from aggressive debt collection practices than the protection 
afforded to them under the FDCPA.95 There are a number of prohibited activities under the 
FCCPA that constitute a violation if it is proven that a defendant engaged in such activities, 
one of which is to “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows 
that the debt is not legitimate . . . .”96 Thus, in the context of hospital price gouging claims, 
the question becomes: could an attempt to collect an unreasonable fee from an uninsured 
patient be considered an attempt to collect an “illegitimate debt” under the FCCPA? 
 
A. Attempting to Collect an Illegitimate Debt Under the FCCPA 
 
A cause of action for violating the FCCPA’s prohibition on collecting illegitimate 
debts has “three elements: an illegitimate debt, a threat or attempt to enforce that debt, and 
knowledge that the debt is illegitimate.”97 Generally, an illegitimate debt under the FCCPA 
can take one of two forms, either a debt that a debt collector is prohibited by law from 
collecting or a debt where a debt collector is attempting to collect more compensation than 
they are entitled to.98 In the context of an unreasonably priced hospital bill, the bill at issue 
 
 
RMG, 2017 WL 2972143, at *5 (D.S.C. July 12, 2017); Leslie v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 
CV171590ESMAH, 2019 WL 4668140, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2019); Giacalone v. Helen Ellis Mem'l 
Hosp. Found., Inc., 8 So. 3d 1232, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating 
Co., Ltd., 559 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Tex. 2018).  
94 Fla. Stat. § 559.55(7) (2020).  
95 Fla. Stat. § 559.552 (2020).  
96 Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (2020).  
97 Davis v. Sheridan Healthcare, Inc., 281 So. 3d 1259, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019), review granted sub 
nom. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis, No. SC191923SC191936, 2020 WL 764156 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2020).  
98 Marchisio v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 919 F.3d 1288, 1305-06, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing 
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could potentially fit into either category. For example, it is settled law in Florida that a 
patient who enters into an open-price contract with a hospital is only responsible for paying 
the hospital a “reasonable” fee for the services received.99 So, when a hospital issues a bill 
that is unreasonably priced, the bill could be viewed as either the hospital attempting to 
collect more compensation than they are owed, since the patient does owe them a 
reasonable fee and nothing more, or a debt that they are prohibited by law from collecting 
any amount over what is reasonable.  
In Hewit v. Stern, for example, a class of mortgagees that were in default brought 
suit alleging that the law firm representing the mortgagors committed multiple FCCPA 
violations by attempting to collect illegitimate debts.100 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged 
that he had sent a letter to the defendant requesting the reinstatement amount for his 
mortgage, and in response, the defendant sent the plaintiff a letter with a list of charges that 
the defendant alleged were due and owing.101 Within that list were charges for one future 
mortgage payment that had not yet accrued, attorney’s fees that had not yet been earned, 
and flat fees for postage charges.102 With respect to the attorney’s fees and the future 
mortgage payment, the court found that attempting to collect these debts before they were 
due was a violation of the FCCPA under section 559.72(9) of the Florida Statutes.103 
Similarly, the court, citing to First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Robins v. 
McGrath, found that the postage charges were office expenses, not costs, that could not be 
charged to an adverse party, and even if they could, the court held that the plaintiff would 
only be responsible for the actual cost of postage, not a standard flat fee.104  
An unreasonable fee for services rendered by a hospital in the context of an open-
price contract is analogous to Hewitt in many respects. Like the attorney’s fees and 
mortgage payment that had not yet accrued in Hewitt, any amount charged by the hospital 
over and above what is reasonable could be viewed as either a debt that did not accrue or 
a fee that had not been earned. Moreover, though the law firm in Hewitt was prohibited 
from collecting postage charges against an adverse party as a matter of law, the court 
pointed out that even if they could recover postage, charging any amount over what was 
actually due, the actual cost of postage, would constitute an FCCPA violation as an attempt 
 
 
to collect mortgage debt after it had been discharged); Hewitt v. Stern, No. 502009CA036046XXXXXM, 
2012 WL 8018580 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sep. 27, 2012) (holding that attempting to collect more on mortgage than 
currently owed and attorney’s fees that had not been earned is FCCPA violation); Pace v. Green Tree 
Servicing, LLC, No. 162014CC3939XXXXMA, 2014 WL 4999218, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 06, 2014) 
(holding plaintiff stated cause of action under FCCPA where mortgage servicer attempted to collect debt 
after discharge by bankruptcy court).   
99 Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  
100 Hewitt v. Stern, No. 502009CA036046XXXXXM, 2012 WL 8018580 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sep. 27, 2012). 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. (Citing Robbins v. McGrath, 955 So. 2d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). 
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to collect an illegitimate debt,105 and it is this line of reasoning that goes to the heart of how 
an unreasonably priced hospital bill can constitute an FCCPA violation. Without question, 
a hospital is entitled to a reasonable fee for services rendered to an uninsured patient who 
enters into an open-price contract with it, or alternatively, where emergency services were 
rendered, and the hospital is seeking compensation under a quasi-contract theory. 
However, a hospital in such a situation is limited to only a reasonable fee, and any attempt 
to collect a fee that exceeds what is considered reasonable could clearly be viewed as a 
“threat or attempt” to collect an “illegitimate” debt, since an unreasonable fee by definition 
exceeds what the hospital is entitled to.   
The last element of an FCCPA violation for attempting to collect an illegitimate 
debt, knowledge that the debt is illegitimate, requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that the 
defendant had “actual knowledge” that the debt was illegitimate.106 The same knowledge 
requirement has been imposed on plaintiffs’ attempting to prove that a debt collector 
violated section 559.72(18) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits debt collectors from 
contacting a debtor directly if the debt collector “has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, 
. . . [the defendant’s] attorney’s name and address.”107 To meet their burden under 
559.72(18), some plaintiffs have sent an offending debt collector a letter to place them on 
notice that the debtor is represented, a tactic which has been successful in more than one 
case.108 Thus, the requirement that the defendant have actual knowledge that the debt they 
are attempting to collect is not legitimate may be able to be satisfied by sending the 
defendant hospital a letter indicating that the alleged debt they are attempting to collect is 
unreasonable.109 
 
B. Attorney’s Fees Under the FCCPA Cause of Action 
 
The biggest benefit to couching a breach of an open-price contract claim within an 
FCCPA claim is the manner in which attorney’s fees are awarded under the FCCPA. 
Section 559.77 of the Florida Statutes provides, inter alia, that a defendant who is found 
liable under the FCCPA is liable for “court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred 
by the plaintiff . . .” and that “if the court finds that the [plaintiff’s] suit fails to raise a 
justiciable issue of law or fact, the plaintiff is liable for court costs and reasonable 
attorney’s fees incurred by the defendant.”110 However, the statute is silent as to whether 
 
 
105 Id.; See also Daniel v. Select Portfolio Servicing, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(holding that plaintiff stated cause of action under FCCPA by alleging mortgage servicer charged more 
money in fees than what was permitted by law).  
106 Marchisio v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 919 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019). 
107 Millstein v. Orlando Orthopedic Assocs., MD, P.A., No. COCE-17-002133 (52), 2017 WL 10260145, at 
*3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2017) (“The FCCPA and Florida courts interpreting same, require only that the 
creditor have knowledge of the Plaintiffs representation with respect to debts.”). 
108 Id.  
109 Id. (holding that defendant was placed on notice that plaintiff was represented by attorney under FCCPA 
after receiving a letter of representation with respect to debt); accord Corley v. Trustus Medical Transport, 
No. 2012-CC-361, 2014 WL 5040107, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 31, 2014).  
110 FA 
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the plaintiff is liable for a prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees if the plaintiff raised a 
justiciable issue and lost.111  
Though not answering the question completely, Florida’s Fifth District Court of 
Appeals answered a strikingly similar question in Clayton v. Bryan.112 In Clayton, a 
plaintiff had brought a cause of action under both the FDCPA and the FCCPA that were 
eventually dismissed; the defendant sought to recover attorney’s fees on the plaintiff’s 
FCCPA claim pursuant to section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, which provides, among 
other things, that if a defendant files an offer of judgement that is not accepted by the 
plaintiff within 30 days and the defendant is found to be either not liable at all or is liable 
for an amount that is at least twenty-five percent less than the offer, the plaintiff will be 
liable for the defendant’s attorney’s fees.113     
The court held that since section 559.552 of the Florida Statutes instructs courts to 
apply the more protective provision(s) of either the FCCPA or the FDCPA in the event of 
an inconsistency between the two acts and since the FDCPA only allows a defendant to 
recover attorney’s fees in the event that a suit was brought in bad faith and for the purpose 
of harassment whereas section 768.79 would allow a defendant who made a particular type 
of settlement offer in an FCCPA claim to recover attorney’s fees if it applied, the FDCPA’s 
provisions concerning a prevailing defendant’s ability to recover attorney’s fees preempted 
section 768.79.114 Thus, though section 559.77 is silent as to whether the plaintiff is liable 
for a prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees if the plaintiff raised a justiciable issue and lost, 
Clayton would seem to indicate that the FDCPA’s provisions concerning a prevailing 
defendant’s ability to recoup attorney’s fees would be controlling in the event a defendant 
was given a pathway under a state statute outside of section 559.77 to recover attorney’s 
fees.115 Moreover, trial courts have had no problem using Clayton as a basis to deny 
defendants’ attempts to invoke section 768.79 as grounds to recoup attorney’s fees in 
FCCPA cases.116 Consequently, this aspect of the FCCPA could make it a more superior 
vehicle under which to bring an unreasonable hospital billing claim than other alternatives 





Hospitals charging uninsured patients exorbitant amounts for services rendered is 
clearly an ongoing problem that needs to be addressed and, given that many of the people 
 
 
111 FLA. STAT. § 559.77 (2020).    
112 Clayton v. Bryan, 753 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).  
113 Id. at 634-35; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79(1) (West 2020).  
114 Seeid. at 635.  
115 Id.  
116 See Hall v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 13-CC-13185, 2015 WL 13864809, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Aug. 26, 2015); Bartle v. Allied Interstate, LLC., No. 2017-CA-000043, 2017 WL 3208981, at *1 (Fla. Cir. 









who are uninsured are also unable to afford legal representation, bringing an FCCPA claim 
along with a breach of an open-price contract action could be an effective way for lawyers 
to accept these claims on a contingency-fee basis and provide legal representation to those 
who need it most.  
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